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Abstract
We propose a decentralized game-theoretic framework for dynamic task allocation problems for multi-agent systems. In our
problem formulation, the agents’ utilities depend on both the rewards and the costs associated with the successful completion
of the tasks assigned to them. The rewards reflect how likely is for the agents to accomplish their assigned tasks whereas
the costs reflect the effort needed to complete these tasks (this effort is determined by the solution of corresponding optimal
control problems). The task allocation problem considered herein corresponds to a dynamic game whose solution depends on
the states of the agents in contrast with classic static (or single-act) game formulations. We propose a greedy solution approach
in which the agents negotiate with each other to find a mutually agreeable (or individually rational) task assignment profile
based on evaluations of the task utilities that reflect their current states. We illustrate the main ideas of this work by means of
extensive numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a dynamic task allocation problem for a multi-agent system whose agents have continuous state and input
spaces and have to complete a set of spatially distributed tasks (obtain in-situ measurements or pick up packages from
different locations over a given spatial domain). We adopt a game-theoretic approach which seeks for task assignments
that maximize the individual utility of each agent conditional on the assignments of their teammates (individual rationality
principle) while also ensuring that the self-interests of the agents are aligned with those of the team. To this aim, we design
the agents’ utilities in accordance with the concept of wonderful life utility [1] (WLU) which allows us to associate the
dynamic task allocation problem with a sequence of potential games [2]. We propose a greedy decentralized algorithm for
the computation of task assignment profiles which are mutually agreeable in the long run.
Literature review: Task allocation problems for multi-agent systems can be addressed by auction based techniques, distributed
and / or multi-objective optimization and game-theoretic methods. The auction-based techniques are centralized when the
agents negotiate with each other under the guidance of an auctioneer [3] and decentralized when they negotiate directly with
each other [4]–[6]. Centralized methods rely on a single point of failure whereas the communication cost in decentralized
methods can be substantial if not prohibitive. Distributed optimization [7] and multi-objective optimization [8] for task
allocation problems are typically quite complex and require some knowledge about the utilities of the other agents and,
more importantly, do not necessarily yield solutions which are mutually agreeable. As suggested in [9], game-theoretic tools
constitute one of the most natural approaches to task allocation problems for intelligent, autonomous agents. Reference [9],
which is the main inspiration of this paper, utilizes the framework of potential games to define in a systematic way the task and
agent utilities as well as several negotiation protocols (game-theoretic learning algorithms [10], [11]) for the computation of
mutually agreeable task assignments in a decentralized or distributed way. The negotiation protocols utilized in [9] converge
to mutually agreeable task assignment profiles without requiring that any agent should know the utility functions of her
teammates (decentralized task allocation). However, their convergence is conditional on the game remaining the same (e.g.,
the functional description of the utilities does not change throughout the negotiation process). Thus, although the equilibrium
of the game is found iteratively in [9], the task allocation problem itself is essentially modeled as a static game. Extensions
of the game-theoretic framework for multi-agent control problems can be found in [12]–[14]. Ref. [15] proposes a myopic
solution approach to a dynamic task allocation problem modeled as a sequence of static (single-act) potential games. The
approach in [15] cannot handle state-dependent utilities in general. Finally, the framework of state-dependent potential
games [16] is only applicable to problems with finite (discrete) state spaces.
Contributions: In this paper, we address a dynamic task allocation problem in which the task utilities depend on both the
rewards earned by the agents for completing their assigned tasks as well as the costs they incur while doing so (cost-to-go
functions of corresponding optimal control problems). Consequently, the utilities are in general state-dependent. We adopt
a decentralized game-theoretic solution approach (each agent knows only her own utility function). The (individual) agent
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utilities are designed in accordance with the WLU framework which ensures that their self-interests are aligned with the
team’s interests under the framework of potential games. We propose a greedy solution approach in which the negotiations
between the agents take place on-the-fly while the agents move in their state space towards their assigned tasks. Every
time an agent changes her individual assignment (and thus her final state destination) she has to update the estimate of the
cost-to-go and consequently her utility function as well (state-dependent utilities). We design the negotiation process such
that the agents compute a mutually agreeable profile which is not likely to change during the last phase of the process.
Outline: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the problem preliminaries. The task,
team and agent utilities are defined in Section III. The open-loop task allocation is addressed in Section IV and the dynamic
problem in Section V. Numerical simulations are presented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII presents concluding remarks
and directions for future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SETUP
Notation: We denote by Rn the set of n-dimensional real vectors. We denote by Z the set of integers. Given a, b ∈ Z
with a ≤ b, we denote by [a, b]d the discrete time interval from a to b, that is, [a, b]d := [a, b] ∩ Z. Given k ∈ Z, we write
Zk to denote the (unbounded) discrete interval [k,∞) ∩ Z. Given a finite set A, we denote by card(A) its cardinality.
Problem setup: We consider a multi-agent system (MAS) comprised of n agents. We denote by xi ∈ Si ∈ Σ and ui ∈ Ui,
for i ∈ [1, n]d, the state and input of the i-th agent of the MAS at time t ≥ 0, where Si and Ui denote her state space and input
space, respectively, and Σ ⊆ Rm. In addition, we denote by x ∈ S the joint state of the MAS, where x := (x1, . . . , xn)
and S := S1 × · · · × Sn (joint state space), and by u ∈ U the joint input of the MAS, where u := (u1, . . . , un) and
U := U1 × · · · × Un (joint input space). Furthermore, we denote by x−i ∈ S−i and u−i ∈ U−i the concatenations of the
states and the inputs of all the agents except from the i-th agent (the sets S−i and U−i are defined accordingly).
The motion of the i-th agent is described by
x˙i = fi(x,u), xi(0) = x
0
i , i ∈ [1, n]d, (1)
where x0i ∈ Si is the initial state of the i-th agent and fi : Si×Ui → Si is her associated vector field. Note that the evolution
of the i-th agent is not fully determined by her own state and input. For instance, in any realistic setting, the input of every
agent at each time is conditioned on the actions of the other agents or at least a subset of them. A similar argument can
be made for the states of the other agents. We assume that the vector field fi satisfies regularity conditions that ensure the
existence and uniqueness of solutions to the differential equations (1) for all piecewise continuous joint inputs u taking
values in U and all joint states x ∈ S. Finally, we write
x˙ = f(x,u), x(0) = x0, (2)
where x0 = (x01, . . . , x
0
n) ∈ S is the joint initial state and f := (f1, . . . , fn) is the joint vector field.
The task allocation problem seeks for individual assignments for a team of n agents and for a given set of p tasks,
T := {T1, . . . , Tp}. Each task is associated with a distinct state in Σ. We denote by XT the set of states associated with
the given tasks, where XT := {xT1 , . . . , xTp}. In principle, an agent can be assigned at most one task in T at each instant
of time although more than one agents can be assigned to the same task simultaneously. We denote by Ai := {aki : k ∈
[1, card(Ai)]d} the set of possible task assignments for the i-th agent given a set of tasks T . Later on, we will see that each
assignment aki induces a corresponding (admissible) control input ui(·) via the solution of a corresponding optimal control
problem. We assume that a∅ ∈ Ai, where a∅ denotes the null assignment (i.e., the i-th agent is not assigned to any task)
which corresponds to the null control input, that is, when ai = a∅, then ui(t) = 0, for all t ≥ 0. Each assignment aki ∈ Ai
is equal to either a task in T , that is, aki = T` where T` ∈ T , or the null assignment, that is, aki = a∅. Thus, Ai ⊆ T ,
where T := T ∪ {a∅}.
III. TASK UTILITIES
The completion of a task Tj ∈ T will accrue rewards to the agents assigned to it. These rewards, which do not depend
on the states of the agents, reflect the importance of this specific task as well as the likelihood of its successful completion
by each agent assigned to it (in general, not all agents are equally likely to complete a specific task successfully). We will
refer to these rewards as the static task utilities. Furthermore, an agent will have to incur a cost to complete her assigned
task (e.g., the transition cost to a certain location associated with this task). It is worth mentioning that the task completion
cost is state-dependent and we will refer to it as the dynamic task completion cost.
Static task utility: Given an action profile a = (a1, . . . , an), we denote by T −1j (a) the index-set corresponding to the agents
assigned to task Tj ∈ T under the particular profile, that is, T −1j (a) = {i ∈ [1, n]d : ai = Tj}. The completion of task Tj
will accrue a reward rTj ≥ 0 to the agent or agents assigned to this task. In general, rTj is a function of the task assignment
profile, that is,
rTj(a) = r¯Tj [1−
∏
i∈T −1j (a)
(1− pij)], (3)
where r¯Tj is the nominal reward of Tj and pij ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of the task Tj be completed successfully by the
i-th agent. If T −1j (a) = ∅, then rTj (a) := 0.
State-dependent task completion cost: Next, we define the cost for completing the task Tj associated with the state xTj at
time t = tf by the i-th agent. Essentially, the task completion cost is taken to be the cost incurred by the i-th agent, which
starts from the state x0i at time t = 0, to reach the state xTj at time t = tf . The latter state transition cost is defined as the
optimal cost-to-go corresponding to the following optimal control problem:
Problem 1: Let ai = Tj , where Tj ∈ T and i ∈ [1, n]d. Furthermore, let xTj ∈ Si be the state associated with the task Tj
and let tf > 0 be the corresponding completion time (fixed and common for all the agents). Then, find an optimal piece-wise
continuous input u?i (·) : [0, tf ]→ Ui that minimizes the following performance index:
Ji(ui(·);x0i , xTj ) :=
∫ tf
0
Li(xi(t), ui(t))dt, (4)
subject to the dynamic constraints (1) and the terminal constraint: Ψi(xi(tf), xTj ) = 0, where Ψi(·;xTj ) is a given C1
function. Finally, the optimal cost-to-go is denoted by ρi(x0i ;xTj ), where ρi(x
0
i ;xTj ) := Ji(u?i (·);x0i , xTj ).
Remark 1 The terminal constraint function Ψi can be defined, for instance, as follows: Ψi(xi(tf), xTj ) = xi(tf)− xTj , in
which case we require that xi(tf) = xTj (hard constraint).
Total Task Utility: The total cost of completion of task Tj under the action profile a = (a1, . . . , an), which is denoted as
RTj (a;x0, xTj ), is defined as the sum of the individual task completion costs of all the agents assigned to that task. More
precisely,
RTj (a;x0, xTj ) :=
∑
i∈T −1j (a)
ρi(x
0
i ;xTj ). (5)
Note that RTj depends on the initial state x0 (more precisely, the initial states of the agents assigned to the task Tj).
Furthermore, the total task utility associated with task Tj for a given x0 is denoted as UTj (a;x0) and defined as follows:
UTj (a;x0) := max{0, rTj (a)−RTj (a,x0;xTj )}. (6)
Note that UTj is state-dependent because the task completion costs ρi(x0i ;xTj ), for i ∈ T −1j (a), are state-dependent.
Individual and Team Utilities and Solution Concepts: First, we define the team’s utility (the latter reflects the team’s collective
welfare), which is denoted by U(a;x0), as follows:
U(a;x0) :=
∑
Tj∈T
UTj (a;x0). (7)
The individual utility of the i-th agent given a task profile a = (ai, a−i), which is denoted as Ui(ai, a−i) or Ui(a), is
taken to be equal to her marginal contribution to the team’s utility U(a;x0), that is,
Ui(a;x0) := U((ai, a−i);x0)− U((a∅, a−i);x0) (8)
from which it follows, in view of (7), that
Ui(a;x0) = UTj ((ai, a−i);x0)− UTj ((a∅, a−i);x0), (9)
where (a∅, a−i) corresponds to the action profile when the i-th agent has a null assignment, that is, ai = a∅. Next, we
provide the definition of the basic solution concept that will be used in our task allocation problem.
Definition 1: An assignment profile a? := (a?i , a
?
−i) ∈ A is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game G0, where
G0 := 〈U1(a;x0), . . . ,Un(a;x0);A〉, if ∀i ∈ [1, n]d
Ui(a?i , a?−i;x0) ≥ Ui(ai, a?−i;x0), ∀ai ∈ Ai. (10)
Remark 2 The solution concept of (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium is fundamental in non-cooperative game theory. When
all agents play in accordance with the Nash equilibrium, they act selfishly and try to maximize their own utilities conditional
on the decisions of others (individual rationality).
IV. THE OPEN-LOOP TASK ALLOCATION PROBLEM AND ITS DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION
A. Problem formulation and analysis
Next, we formulate the task allocation problem as a non-cooperative game. In the following formulation, we only account
for the estimates of the task completion costs at the initial time (open-loop approach).
Problem 2 (OLTA: Open-Loop Task Allocation): Let tf > 0 and x0 ∈ S be given. Then, find a (time-invariant) task
assignment profile a? ∈ A, where a? := (a?i , a?−i), such that for all i ∈ [1, n]d the inequality (10) is satisfied. In other
words, the task assignment profile a := (a?i , a
?
−i) corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the game G0.
Remark 3 In the formulation of the open-loop task allocation problem (Problem 2), the agents’ utilities (or, more precisely,
their functional descriptions) do not change with time, as the agents progress towards the states of their assigned tasks. This
is because their estimated task completion costs are based on knowledge available at time t = 0 and these estimates are not
updated afterwards. To the i-th individual task assignment a?i from the optimal profile a
?, where, say, a?i = Tj , we associate
a corresponding state xTj , which in turn determines the terminal constraint Ψ(xi(tf);xTj ) = 0 in Problem 1. Because all
the task assignments are time-invariant, the control input u?i (·) that solves Problem 1 will not be updated along the i-th
agent’ ensuing trajectory.
It is well-known that potential games correspond to a special class of non-cooperative games that always admit pure
strategy Nash equilibria. We claim that Problem 2 corresponds to an exact potential game [17].
Definition 2: The game, G0, corresponds to an exact potential game, if there exists an exact potential, that is, a function
P : A → R such that, for all i ∈ [1, n]d and a ∈ A, it holds true that
Ui(a′i, a−i;x0)− Ui(ai, a−i;x0)
= P(a′i, a−i)− P(ai, a−i), (11)
for all ai, a′i ∈ Ai.
Proposition 1: The open-loop task allocation problem (Problem 2) with task team utility and individual utilities defined
by (7) and (10), respectively, is an exact potential game with potential P = U(ai, a−i;x0), for all ai ∈ Ai.
Proof: We will directly verify (11). In particular,
U(a′i, a−i;x0)− U(ai, a−i;x0)
=
∑
Tj∈T
(UTj (a′i, a−i;x0)− UTj (ai, a−i;x0))
=
p∑
k=1
k 6=i
UTj (ak, a−k;x0)−
p∑
k=1
UTj (ak, a−k;x0)
+ UTj (a′i, a−i;x0)
= UTj (a′i, a−i;x0)− UTj (ai, a−i;x0)
=
(UTj (a′i, a−i;x0)− UTj (a∅, a−i;x0))
− (UTj (ai, a−i;x0)− UTj (a∅, a−i;x0))
= Ui(a′i, a−i;x0)− Ui(ai, a−i;x0),
where in the derivation of the last equality we have used Eq. (9). In view of Definition 2, we conclude that G0 corresponds
to an exact potential game.
B. Negotiation protocols for decentralized task allocation
Problem 2 can be solved by utilizing standard tools for the computation of Nash equilibria of noncooperative (static
or single-act) games and in particular potential games [17]. An alternative approach is to employ game-theoretic learning
algorithms which generate a sequence of task assignment profiles that converge to a Nash equilibrium. Some of these
algorithms include the fictitious play (FP), spatial adaptive play (SAP), and generalized regret matching (GRM) algorithms
to name but a few; the reader may refer to [9] for more information on these and other similar algorithms. A key point is
that for their realization, an agent does not have to know the utilities of her teammates (decentralized implementation).
During the negotiation (learning) process, the task assignment profile of the team is updated at different time instants that
form a non-decreasing sequence {τk}∞k=0 in [0, tf ] such that τ0 = 0 and limk→∞ τk = tf . The time instant τk corresponds
to the k-th stage of the negotiation process. At that stage, the i-th agent picks her new task assignment, which we denote
as ai(τk); we also denote the corresponding profile of the whole team as a(τk). The exact definition of the ai(τk) will be
determined by the particular learning algorithm that will be employed, which in turn will rely on a corresponding information
set Iik. The latter set may encode information about the past performance of the i-th agent (measured in terms of past values
of her own utility) as well as information about the history (whole or truncated) of her teammates’ actions (such information
may correspond to, for instance, the empirical distribution of the agents’ past task assignments). We write
ai(τk) = φi(Iik;G0), a(τk) = φ(Ik;G0), i ∈ [1, n]d, (12)
where φi : Iik → Ai, for i ∈ [1, n]d, is the update law (or proposal) of the individual target assignment of the i-th agent
whereas φ : Ik → A, with φ(Ik;G0) := (φ1(I1k ;G0), . . . , φn(Ink ;G0)) is the update law of the task assignment profile of
the MAS given the joint information set Ik := I1k × · · · × Ink . The following claim is based on the analysis provided in [9]
(refer to, for instance, Theorem 4.1) and references therein.
Claim 1: The update law a(τk) which is defined as in (12) and corresponds to one of the decentralized negotiation
protocols (game-theoretic learning algorithms) used [9] will converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game G0.
It is important to emphasize that the update law for the task assignment profile will solve Problem 2 under the assumption
that throughout the interval [0, tf ], the functional description of the utilities will be based on their initial estimates at time
t = 0. However, the agents’ utilities are state-dependent and thus their functional description will change along the agents’
ensuing trajectories. This variability in the agents’ preferences and capabilities (as reflected on their utilities) cannot be
captured in this update law as well as the OLTA problem itself. An alternative interpretation of the negotiation process
is to assume that it does not take place over the time interval [0, tf ] but instantaneously, at time t = 0. In other words,
the clock is paused until the negotiations have converged (within some acceptable tolerance) to a Nash equilibrium of the
potential game G0. Subsequently, the agents can execute the corresponding inputs that will transfer them to the terminal
states associated with their assigned tasks (these inputs are computed by solving Problem 1 for each agent). The input signal
will remain the same function of time, for all t ∈ [0, tf ]. It is worth mentioning that the game-theoretic learning algorithms
can be implemented based on local information (distributed implementation) by requiring that an agent cannot be assigned
a task which is not within a certain range % > 0 from her (range constrained case) in contrast with the nominal (range
unconstrained case) in which %→∞.
V. DYNAMIC TASK ALLOCATION AND A GREEDY ALGORITHM FOR ITS SOLUTION
A. Problem formulation
Next, we formulate a dynamic version of the task allocation problem in which the fact that the agents’ utilities change
along their ensuing trajectories is accounted in the determination of their task assignments in contrast with the OLTA problem.
In this problem formulation, a new game Gt, where Gt := 〈U1(·;x(t)), . . . ,Un(·;x(t));A〉 is essentially obtained at each
t ∈ [0, tf ] as the agents move in their state space.
Problem 3 (DTA: Dynamic Task Allocation): Let tf > 0 and x0 ∈ S be given. Then, find a time-varying task assignment
profile a?(·) : [0, tf ]→ A, where a?(t) := (a?i (t), a?−i(t)), which is such that for all i ∈ [1, n]d:
Ui(a?i (t), a?−i(t);x(t)) ≥ Ui(ai(t), a?−i(t);x(t)),
for all ai(t) ∈ Ai, as t→ tf . In other words, the task assignment profile a?(t) converges to a Nash equilibrium of the game
Gt as t→ tf .
Remark 4 Problem 3 seeks for a task assignment profile that will become mutually agreeable as t approaches the final
time tf . Note that if tf is taken to be sufficiently large, then the solution to the Problem 3 will essentially converge to a
steady-state task assignment profile.
B. A greedy algorithm for task allocation
Next we propose a greedy solution approach to address Problem 3. To ensure that the game-theoretic learning algorithms
discussed in Section IV-B will converge to a Nash equilibrium as t→ tf , we propose to stop updating the agents’ utilities at
time t = tf− for some 0 <  < tf so that the utilized learning algorithm (whose convergence is guaranteed only for a static
game) are given the chance to converge during the sub-interval [tf − , tf ]. A key difference between the DTA and OLTA
problems is that the static game that determines the task assignment profile in the former is not G0 (game corresponding to
time t = 0), as in the latter problem, but a game corresponding to time t = tf − , assuming that the (dynamic) game has
evolved for t ∈ [0, tf − ].
Next, we present the main steps of the proposed greedy algorithm. To this aim, let us consider a sequence {τk}∞k=0 as in
Section IV-B and let K = K() be the first positive integer at which τK > tf −  for the given  (the existence of such K
is guaranteed by the fact that τk → tf as k →∞). Now, let φ(Ik;Gτk) denote the update law of a negotiation protocol as
in Section IV-B. Let us consider the following update law:
ad(τk) :=
{
φ(Ik;Gτk), for k ∈ [0,K − 1]d,
φ(Ik;GτK ), for k ∈ ZK .
(13)
We claim that the update law (13) will find an approximate (in the sense that we will explain shortly later) solution to
Problem 3.
Proposition 2: The piecewise constant dynamic task assignment profile a(t) = ad(τk), ∀t ∈ [τk, τk+1) for all k ∈ Z≥0,
where ad is defined as in (13), will converge, as t→ tf , to a Nash equilibrium of the game GT , where T ∈ [tf − , tf ].
Proof: Given that {τk}∞k=0 is a non-decreasing sequence in [0, tf ] which converges to tf as k →∞, we conclude that
τk ∈ [tf − , tf ], for all k ∈ ZK . After truncating the K − 1 first elements of {τk}∞k=0, we obtain a new non-decreasing
sequence {σn}∞n=0, where σn = τn+K , for n ∈ Z0, which implies that σ0 = τK and limn→∞ σn = tf . In view of Claim 1,
the update law a(τk) := φ(Ik;G0) defined in (12) will converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game G0 as k →∞. From
real analysis, we know that after truncating the first K − 1 elements of the convergent sequence {a(τk)}∞k=0, we obtain a
new sequence {a(σn)}∞n=0 that will remain convergent with the same limit. The previous claim on convergence holds true
for any game Gτk for a fixed k when the latter is treated as a static game (with a possibly different limit for each τk). We
conclude that the sequence {ad(σn)}∞n=0, where ad is defined in (13), will also converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game
GτK , where by definition τK ∈ [tf − , tf ]. This concludes the proof.
Remark 5 If at time t = τk the individual assignment of the i-agent attains a different value than at t = τk−1, then the
state corresponding to her new task will also be different. Therefore, the i-th agent will have to solve Problem 1 with the
updated terminal constraint, with her initial state set equal to xi(τk) and the final time to tf − τk.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present numerical simulations to illustrate the main ideas of the methods proposed so far. We consider
a team of agents with double integrator dynamics, that is, p¨i = ui, with pi(0) = p0i and p˙i(0) = v
0
i , where pi ∈ R2
(p0i ∈ R2) and p˙i ∈ R2 (v0i ∈ R2) denote, respectively, the position and velocity of the i-th agent at time t (t = 0),
i ∈ [1, n]d. The performance index is given by J (ui(·)) := (1/2)
∫ tf
0
|ui(t)|2dt whereas the terminal constraint function
Ψi(xi(tf);xTj ) := xi− xTj , where xi := (pi, p˙i) ∈ R4 and xTj := (pTj , 0) ∈ R4, which means that the i-th agents tries to
reach the position pTj associated with her assigned task Tj at time t = tf with zero terminal velocity (soft landing). It turns out
(see, for instance, [18]) that the optimal control input is given by u?i (t; tf , x
0
i ) = α+tβ, α := (6/t
2
f )(pTj−p0i−tfv0i )+(2/tf)v0i ,
β := −(12/t3f )(pTj−p0i−tfv0i )−(6/t2f )v0i , and the optimal cost-to-go by ρi(x0i ;xTj ) := (1/2)(tf |α|2+t2f αTβ+(1/3)t3f |β|2).
TABLE I
TEAM UTILITIES (n = p = 100) FOR RANGE CONSTRAINED AND UNCONSTRAINED CASES
GRM SAP
OLTA DTA OLTA DTA
tf %→∞ % = 0.3 %→∞ % = 0.3 %→∞ % = 0.3 %→∞ % = 0.3
2 37.1087 39.2745 25.4762 33.9018 40.4893 39.3430 35.8556 36.2413
5 44.4502 42.6770 43.2366 42.4138 44.2700 41.9399 43.3736 41.4702
10 45.2247 42.9761 44.9560 43.2582 44.7164 42.2792 44.5670 42.5155
We will present numerical simulations for both Problem 2 (OLTA) and Problem 3 (DTA) based on the SAP and GRM
algorithms from [9] for both the range constrained and unconstrained cases. We will use a constant time step δt (although
in Proposition 2, we proposed a decreasing time step, it turns out that a sufficiently small constant step is adequate for our
simulations). The negotiation process for the OLTA ran for k rounds (all these rounds took place at time t = 0 per the
discussion in Section IV-B) in order to converge to a Nash equilibrium before the agents start moving toward the states
(a) t = 0+ (b) t = 2.6 (c) t = 10
Fig. 1. Dynamic task allocation for the range constrained case (GRM, n = p = 10, % = 0.5, tf = 10, U = 3.6154)
(a) t = 0+ (b) t = 2.1 (c) t = 10
Fig. 2. Dynamic task allocation for the range unconstrained case (GRM, n = p = 10, %→∞, tf = 10, U = 4.0398)
corresponding to their assigned tasks. We have used k = 100 for the GRM algorithm and k = 1000 for the SAP algorithm.
The negotiation process for the DTA starts with a random task assignment profile at t = 0 and subsequently, the agents
continue to update their utilities and individual assignments at every time step (k = tf/δt). We have noticed that δt must
be smaller for the SAP algorithm than the GRM algorithm to achieve convergence. For this reason, we select δt = 0.1 for
GRM and δt = 0.01 for SAP when solving the DTA problem. Per the discussion in Section V-B, the agents’ utilities are
not updated after time t = tf −  whereas the negotiation process continues until t = tf . In our simulations we have used
the following parameter values:  = tf/20, p0i ∈ [0, 1]2, p˙0i ∈ [−0.1, 0.1]2, pTj ∈ [0, 1]2, r¯Tj ∈ [0, 1], and pi,j ∈ [0, 1]
where i ∈ [1, n]d and j ∈ [1, p]d. For the implementation of the GRM and SAP algorithms, we have used ρ = 0.1 (discount
factor), α = 0.5 (parameter for the agents’ willingness to optimize at each time step) and randomization level τ = 10/k2.
Finally, % ∈ {0.3, 0.5} (parameter for range constrained implementations of SAP and GRM). All the graphs and numerical
outcomes presented herein are averaged data from 102 simulation runs.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the evolution of the agents trajectories computed for the DTA problem at different time instants
for the range constrained and the unconstrained cases, respectively. In particular, the dash lines indicate the current task
assignments whereas the solid curves correspond to the past segments of the agents’ trajectories. Fig. 3 shows that both
the team utility obtained by the GRM and SAP negotiation protocols for the DTA problem reach the team utility attained
by the solution to the OLTA problem. In addition, the negotiations converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium as t→ tf
in agreement with Proposition 2. Table I shows the values of the total team utility U for different scenarios for both the
range constrained and range unconstrained cases with a significant number of agents and tasks and for different values of
the terminal time tf . We observe that for the DTA problem the team’s performance improves as tf increases. As we have
discussed in Remark 3, when tf is large, then the equilibrium assignment profile corresponds to a “steady-state” profile in
which case the performance achieved by the solutions to both the OLTA and DTA problems are expected to be similar. The
obtained results confirm the latter claim.
(a) GRM (b) SAP
Fig. 3. Team utilities versus time (n = p = 100, tf = 10)
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have presented a framework to address dynamic task allocation problems for multi-agent systems
with state-dependent utilities. Our approach, which leverage game-theoretic learning algorithms for the solution of static
potential games, offers a practical solution to a class of more realistic and challenging dynamic task allocation problems for
autonomous mobile agents. In our future work, we plan to extend the results presented herein to even more realistic task
allocation problems including scenarios with deadlines attached to tasks, pop-up tasks and agents with varying capabilities
and preferences.
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